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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past several decades, the United States has been faced
with important questions concerning its immigration policies.1
Although current discussion covers many areas of immigration, the
deportation of criminal aliens is one of the most hotly debated. 2
Daniel Kanstroom notes that the U.S. is undergoing a “massive
deportation experiment that is exceptionally sweeping and harsh by
virtually any historical or comparative measure.”3 Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) records reveal that there have been more
than twenty-five million deportation events in the past twenty-five
years.4 Further evidence of the explosive number of deportations is

See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, “Passed Beyond Our Aid:” U.S. Deportation,
Integrity, and the Rule of Law, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 95, 95 (2011).
Kanstroom acknowledges the reality of “more than eleven million undocumented
people living and working” within the United States. Id. at 96–97. He focuses on
some of the questions that specifically have to do with the deportation of those who
hold green cards, arguing that it is important to critically examine how the system
is working. Id. at 98. Some of the questions he presents are: “What are the real
policy goals of this form of deportation? Should a long-term lawful permanent
resident with substantial U.S. family ties be deported for petty crimes, such as the
possession of a marijuana cigarette? Is the system working in a fair and just way?”
Id. at 99.
2
See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 1; Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
3
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 97; Daniel Kanstroom, Immigration Law:
Current Challenges and the Elusive Search for Legal Integrity, in IMMIGRATION
PRACTICE MANUAL 0101, § 1.1 (2nd ed. 2012) [hereinafter Current Challenges].
See also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299
(2011) (“By every objective measure, deportation has never before been such a
pervasive feature of American society and never before been so connected to the
criminal process.”).
4
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 97; Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1
(citing Table 36 of DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
95
(2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf;
DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2010
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf.
1
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the estimated backlog of 300,000 deportation cases.5 The system
struggles to accommodate the large number of pending cases, as
there are only 272 immigration judges available to handle the cases.6
Coupled with, and perhaps fueling, the influx in deportations is the
U.S. public’s perception of immigrants.7 Americans generally view
immigrants as criminals and lump undocumented (or “illegal”)
immigrants in the same category as immigrants who were lawfully
admitted to the country.8 Deportation campaigns initiated by the
government refer to “criminal aliens” and place emphasis on
targeting the “worst of the worst” aliens.9 The truth is that many of
those who are deported are legal permanent resident aliens
(permanent residents), also known as “green card” holders.10 They
were lawfully admitted to the U.S., have grown up in the U.S., and
have fully integrated with the culture and members of the
population.11 For these individuals, deportation means that they will
5

See Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for
Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and
Recognizing Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 772 (2012).
6
Id.
7
See Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1348–49. Markowitz notes that:
[P]ublic perception increasingly and unambiguously conflates
deportable offenses and crimes. This is true on both sides of the
ideological spectrum—whether it is the liberal who is shocked to
learn that detained immigrants do not receive appointed lawyers
or the conservative talk show caller who declares all “illegal
immigrants are criminals.” Indeed, Americans increasingly view
undocumented immigrants in particular, and immigrants in
general, as criminals. This is so even though deportation
proceedings continue to enjoy the formal “civil label” and even
though the great weight of empirical evidence demonstrates that
immigrants are less prone to criminal activity than native-born
populations.
Id.
8

See id.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Record Number of Criminals Deported, Many
Based
on
Traffic
Violations,
FOXNEWS.COM
(July
22,
2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/22/traffic-violations-make-up-bulkoffense-among-deported-criminals/.
10
See, e.g., Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1.
11
Id.
9

264

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-1

be removed from the country and separated from all that they have
ever known, including family, friends, and a familiar lifestyle.12
They are taken to places outside of the U.S. where they do not know
anyone, do not understand the culture and, perhaps, do not even
know the local language.13 They are not permitted to re-enter the
U.S., even for a short visit to see family members left behind.14
Further, although many of the permanent residents who are deported
have committed crimes, they can hardly be collectively described as
the “worst of the worst” criminal offenders.15 Instead, statistics show
that many permanent residents are deported for committing relatively
minor offenses.16
Permanent residents who commit deportable offenses often face
more severe consequences than aliens who entered the country
illegally.17
Further, permanent residents have been seriously
impacted by reforms in immigration law.18 Particularly in the 1990s,
acts of terrorism such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993 and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1996 fueled the negative
public perception of immigrants and encouraged U.S. policymakers

12

Id.
Id. A palpable example of a case where an alien is sent “back” to a country
he has virtually no association with is drawn from the case of a boy named Joao
Herbert. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 774. Herbert was an alien who was
adopted from Brazil by two United States citizens. Id. He was never naturalized,
but was raised by his adoptive parents in the U.S. See id. During high school,
Herbert was arrested for selling marijuana. Id. He was then deported and sent to
Brazil, where he was unable to adapt to the language and culture. Id. at 774–75.
Later, Herbert was shot and killed in the slums. Meneses, supra note 5, at 775.
14
Id. David Sullivan writes that given the harsh consequences of deportation,
it comes as no surprise that the Supreme Court has referred to deportation as “a
‘drastic measure’ that is ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile.’” Dennis M.
Sullivan, Immigration: The Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 63 WIS. LAW.
16, 16 (1990) (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
15
See Meneses, supra note 5, at 774.
16
Id. (“The crimes triggering deportation of lawful permanent residents are
often minor offenses, but are lumped together with far more serious crimes by
overly broad categories.”). See also Current Challenges, supra note 3, at § 1.1
(explaining that “the vast majority of criminal deportees stand accused of relatively
minor offenses.”).
17
Meneses, supra note 5, at 773.
18
See Morawetz, supra note 2, at 1936.
13
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to create legislation reflecting the concern for national security.19
Two such pieces of legislation—the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)—
expanded the reach of removal laws and drew criticism from the
policy, professional, and government sectors.20 The 1996 laws may
actually make it more likely that a permanent resident convicted of a
criminal offense will face deportation.21
The effect of these laws, which will be discussed in more detail
infra,22 is particularly important to the realm of administrative law,
where administrative review is crucial to ensuring that decisions
made on the administrative level will not have arbitrarily negative
and irreversible effects upon deported aliens. There is evidence that
an increased number of immigration cases decided at the
administrative level23 are being appealed to the courts of appeals.24
19

See Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief
Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2821 (2006); Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 95.
20
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 95. These laws
dramatically (and retroactively) expanded many grounds for
exclusion and deportation, creating mandatory detention for may
classes of non-citizens; inventing new “fast-track” deportation
systems; eliminating judicial review of certain types of
deportation (removal) orders; discarding some and limiting other
discretionary “waivers” of deportability; vastly
increasing
possible state and local law enforcement involvement in
deportation; and even permitting the use of secret evidence for
non-citizens accused of “terrorist” activity. As a direct result of
these laws, hundreds of thousands of people have been excluded
and deported from the United States who—under prior laws—
would have been allowed to become legal permanent residents
and (probably) naturalized citizens.
Id. at 95–96.
21
Morawetz, supra note 2, at 1937.
22
See infra notes 28–34, 58–62, 91–121 and accompanying text.
23
It is important to understand the structure of the administrative system
governing deportation cases. In the 1920s, Congress created the Immigration
Board of Review as a part of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Rick
Fang-Chi Yeh, Today’s Immigration Legal System: Flaw and Possible Reforms, 10
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 441, 445 (2009). In the 1940s, Congress replaced the
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The courts of appeals often reverse and openly criticize immigration
judges’ decisions.25 However, critics of the administrative review
process have argued that, “administrative and judicial review of
deportation cases has been severely limited for many years.”26 The
lack of judicial review has resulted in mistakes that have not been
noticed.27 On top of this, AEDPA and IIRIRA have arguably
decreased aliens’ access to the judicial process by limiting the
availability of hearings for aliens.28
The enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA has clearly expanded the
potential for administrative error in at least one area: the application
of what was formerly known as the section 212(c) waiver.29 Before
AEDPA and IIRIRA were passed, section 212(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) gave the Attorney General the discretion

Immigration Board of Review with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
within the Department of Justice (DOJ). Id. In 1983, the BIA was combined with
the Immigration Trial Court, a branch of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). Id. Together, these two bodies became the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), which currently stands as the agency that controls
U.S. immigration adjudication. Id. at 445–46. The Director of the EOIR reports to
the U.S. Attorney General. Id. at 446. The Attorney General appoints hundreds of
immigration judges to sit as administrative judges in various immigration trial
courts throughout the country. Id. at 446–47. Within the EOIR, the BIA remains
the highest administrative appellate body for immigration cases. Id. at 447–48. It
has appellate jurisdiction to hear all immigration appeals. Id. at 448.
24
Id. at 441–42 (“In recent years, the number of immigration cases petitioned
from the immigration administrative agencies to the United States Court of Appeals
. . . has increased sharply even though immigration cases filed at the administrative
and appellate level increased at a normal pace.”) (parenthesis omitted).
25
See id. at 442. Fang-Chi Yeh attributes the high reversal rates to the DOJ’s
immigration policy reforms, arguing that the reforms do not work because they fail
to address the more structural deficiencies of the immigration adjudication. Id. at
442–43. He states that “[t]he underlying flaw is the system’s foundation, which is
not built to successfully handle the current number of immigration cases while
ensuring fair and impartial trial outcomes.” Id. at 443.
26
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101.
27
Id.
28
See R. Andrew Chereck, The Deportation of Criminal Immigrants, 9 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 609, 611 (2003).
29
See Distinti, supra note 19, at 2811 (stating that “AEDPA and IIRIRA
created confusion in criminal reentry cases where the [BIA] or an [immigration
judge] failed to consider a potentially eligible alien for section 21(c) relief during
his deportation.”).
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to waive the deportation of permanent residents who had committed
crimes for which they could be deported.30 If the waiver was
granted, the alien could retain permanent resident status and remain
in the U.S.31 Section 248 of IIRIRA replaced section 212(c) with a
new section called “cancellation of removal.”32 However, the
Supreme Court has held that the section 212(c) waiver still applies to
aliens who would have been eligible for the waiver at the time they
pled guilty to the deportable offense.33 Where the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) or an immigration judge mistakenly fails
to allow an alien discretionary relief under the waiver, issues of
fairness in the administrative review process come into play.34
Avoiding errors associated with section 212(c) is especially
important because errors in deportation cases may prove to be
irreversible.35 Even where the Supreme Court has reviewed removal
30

Id. at 2819.
Id. at 2820.
32
Chereck, supra note 28, at 611. The Cancellation of Removal provision was
codified under INA section 240(a). Distinti, supra note 19, at 2822. Another
major change in brought about by the 1996 legislation was AEDPA’s amendment
of section 212(c), which made it so that the waiver could not apply to aliens who
were convicted of aggravated felonies. See Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2005).
33
Distinti, supra note 19, at 2822–23 (citing Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001)).
34
See Distinti, supra note 19, at 2828–32. Both the Ninth and Second Circuits
have held that “failure to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief can constitute
fundamental unfairness.” Id. at 2832. To prove unfairness, the alien has to show
that the failure prejudiced him or her in some way. Id. at 2838.
35
See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101–02. In the case Fernandes Pereira v.
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), the First Circuit held that “nunc pro tunc
relief is unavailable to remedy an agency’s erroneous interpretation of the law.”
Corey M. Dennis, Immigration Law—Nunc Pro Tunc Relief Unavailable Where
Erroneous Legal Interpretation Rendered Alien Ineligible for Deportation
Waiver—Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (2007). See also Pereira, 417 F.3d at 47. Nunc pro tunc is “an avenue
of discretionary relief historically available to aliens who, but for a judicial error,
would have been eligible for a deportation waiver.” Dennis, supra note 14, at
1051. The respondent in Pereira had been convicted of an aggravated felony and
sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. Pereira, 417 F.3d at 40; Dennis, supra
note 14, at 1051. The court reasoned that this took him out of the running for relief
under the waiver because “section 212(c)’s plain language indicates Congress’s
intent to render discretionary relief unavailable to aliens incarcerated for at least
31
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decisions and found errors in reasoning, a deported alien has virtually
no remedy and the burden and consequences of the mistake fall
solely on the alien.36 Arguably, the BIA and immigration judges may
consider a removed alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider the case.37
Such motions are discretionary tools that might be presumed to
five years on aggravated felony offenses.” Dennis, supra note 14, at 1051; see also
Pereira, 417 F.3d at 48. Dennis argues that although the First Circuit came to the
correct conclusion in Pereira, it did not give due deference to the fact that nunc pro
tunc relief has been available to correct mistakes in immigration cases for a long
time and that Congress has not prevented the BIA from awarding relief under
section 212(c) for more than sixty years. Dennis, supra note 14, at 1054. Dennis
also argues that “the court failed to recognize that [nunc pro tunc] relief is
necessary to mitigate the harsh consequences of deportation laws.” Id.
36
Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 101–02. Kanstroom argues that the uncaught
mistakes should not be taken lightly. Id. at 102.
All of these facts add up to a powerful indictment of the
accuracy, integrity, justice, and fairness of the deportation
system. It indicates that many thousands of deportees may
reasonably claim that they should still be in the United States,
living with their families. The full scope of this problem can
probably never be accurately measured. But we can try.
Consider the many millions of people who have been deported in
the last fifteen years, and then imagine a miniscule—maybe one
or two percent—error rate. Even assuming such a small error
rate, we are still talking about some 80,000 to 100,000 mistakes
over the past several years alone, including refugees, asylumseekers, and many thousands of long-term legal residents.
Id. Some might be surprised that the mistakes do not only affect non-U.S. citizens.
Mistakes made in deportation cases have also lead to the deportation of U.S.
citizens. Id. at 100 (referencing the case of Pedro Guzman, a cognitively disabled,
U.S. citizen born in California who was arrested for trespassing and mistakenly
deported to Mexico). Kanstroom describes Guzman's case as follows:
Mr. Guzman was transferred to ICE custody, which transported
him by bus to the streets of Tijuana. No attorney or family
members were ever present during the removal process.
Mr.
Guzman had virtually no money and could not contact his family.
He wandered the streets for three months, eating out of garbage
cans and bathing in the Tijuana River while his terrified family
desperately searched for him.
Id. at 100–01.
37
See id. at 102.
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provide the safety net that removed aliens who think their case was
decided erroneously may utilize to have their case re-heard.38
However, this is not true in practice as the BIA has held that removed
aliens have “passed beyond [its] aid,” a statement that carries the
weight of defeat for many who could have benefitted from another
shot at the system.39
Where mistakes in legal theory and reasoning made in removal
cases are not caught, the results can be devastating for the aliens such
mistakes affect.40 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Judulang
v. Holder41 recognized this, and condemned any standard of review
regarding the section 212(c) waiver that would facilitate error
through arbitrary and capricious application.42 Judulang addresses
the issues that are important in today’s immigration climate,
answering some of the difficult questions that were raised concerning
the administrative review of removal cases after the enactment of the
AEDPA and IIRIRA.43 The case also clears up questions concerning
how criminal aliens should be viewed within the current system and

38

See id.
See id. Kanstroom describes the BIA’s conclusion that removed aliens are
beyond help:
39

Deportation . . . is a “transformative event that fundamentally
alters the alien’s posture under the law.” Thus, the consequence
of a deportee’s removal—even if it was done in error—is
“not
just physical absence from the country, but also a nullification of
legal status, which leaves him in no better position after
departure than any other alien who isoutside the territory of the
United States.” That is to say, in this legal limbo, the deportee
fundamentally lacks rights.
Id. Kanstroom criticizes the BIA’s approach by asserting that, “[t]his rigid,
formalist approach means that countless mistakes have likely gone undiscovered,
let alone rectified.” Id.
40
See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. See also Allen C. Ladd,
Protecting Your Non-Citizen Client from Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Activity, S.C. LAW., May 2004, at 38, 40 (stating that, “the consequences [of
criminal convictions for non-citizens] are often severe: forcible removal from the
United States . . . and a bar to lawful admission . . . in the future.”).
41
132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
42
See discussion infra Part IV.
43
See discussion infra Part IV.
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narrows the margin of error in removal cases where section 212(c)
may be applied.44 Although Judulang does not answer all of the
questions currently facing the United States immigration system, it
could potentially temper the number of mistakes made during the
removal process by admonishing immigration courts and the BIA to
utilize sound reasoning in deciding which aliens will ultimately be
considered deportable.45
This note examines Judulang and its impact on review standards
for determining section 212(c) eligibility. Part II of this note will
focus on the impact that AEDPA and IIRIRA have had on the
availability of relief for permanent residents who have been slated for
removal and how the administrative review process has confronted
these changes.46 Specifically, that part addresses the historical
availability of the section 212(c) waiver and how the 1996 legislation
affected permanent residents convicted of crimes prior to the
enactment date of the new laws.47 It will address the struggle that
courts engaging in the administrative review process have had in
deciding cases involving the waiver and the various approaches the
circuit courts have taken in an attempt to define the correct standard
for deciding which classes of aliens the waiver may apply to.48
Part III of the note summarizes Judulang’s factual and procedural
background.49 Part IV engages in a step-by-step analysis of Justice
Elena Kagan’s unanimous opinion and addresses the Court’s
treatment of the arbitrary and capricious standards utilized by the
BIA to make removal decisions.50 Part V of the note addresses the
impact Judulang has had on immigration law, both generally and
with respect to administrative law.51 The note concludes that even
though Judulang fails to neatly answer every question that arises on
this subject, it does take a step in the right direction.52 Judulang’s

44

See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
46
See infra Part II.
47
See infra Part II.
48
See infra Part II.
49
See infra Part III.
50
See infra Part IV.
51
See infra Part V.
52
See infra Parts V and VI.
45
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holding is particularly significant in an area of law where the
standards used to decide immigration cases upon appeal have been
varied and, at times, difficult to interpret.53 The holding also ensures
a certain level of procedural due process for permanent residents who
have committed minor offenses in the past and upon whom
deportation would have a devastating effect.54
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the fact that an alien is eligible for deportation has
not meant conclusively that the alien will be deported.55 Immigration

53

See infra Parts V and VI.
See infra Parts V and VI. The due process considerations related to
deportation proceedings are complex. Part of the issue is that because deportation
proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal proceedings, they are not
afford the same level of due process protections as criminal proceedings. See
Meneses, supra note 5, at 769–70. Shaneela Khan describes the situation Legal
Permanent Residents (LPR) face this way:
54

Imagine coming to the United States as a legal resident, but
only imagine that you have come right after kindergarten, when
you barely understand the difference between being a citizen and
being a legal resident. From childhood to adulthood, you have
known no other home than America, and consider yourself
nothing else but an American. So when you commit a crime, you
expect to be convicted through due process, and then sentenced
to jail, like any other American. However, imagine instead that
after you have committed a crime, your punishment may entail
being kicked out of this country and having to return to the
country you were born in, one that you barely remember and
have had no connection to since you were a baby. Further,
imagine that before your removal hearing, you are imprisoned.
As an American, you would have had the right to a
hearing
before being imprisoned, and perhaps have been able to post bail
and get released. However, since you are a legal permanent
resident, you have no such rights and your freedom can be taken
prior to a removal hearing, without judicial review.
Shaneela Khan, Alienating Our Nation’s Legal Permanent Residents: An Analysis
of Demore v. Kim and its Impact on America’s Immigration System, 24 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 113, 113–14 (2004).
55
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 750 (7th ed. 2012).
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law has provided several venues through which even aliens who have
been convicted of deportable offenses can seek relief from removal.56
The reasoning behind allowing a criminal alien to remain in the
United States relates to the significant impact removal has on
noncitizens and their families.57 The enactment of AEDPA and
IIRIRA in 1996 changed the way in which at least some of these
waivers work.58
Understanding the impact that AEDPA and IIRIRA have had on a
permanent resident’s eligibility for a waiver requires an overview of
how the governing law has changed over the past several decades.59
Historically, immigration has been governed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).60 Before the AEDPA and IIRIRA
56

Id.
Id. See also supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. Aleinikoff et al.
write that
57

[t]he longer a noncitizen has lived in the United States—legally
or illegally—the greater the ties she is likely to have established
and the greater the hardship that removal will entail.
The
burdens do not fall solely on the noncitizen: family and friends
may be deprived of significant personal relationships, employers
may lose productive employees, and neighborhoods may lose
valued residents. Not surprisingly, then, a number of avenues of
relief are available to noncitizens, especially those who have
lived in the United States for a substantial period of time and
have close relatives who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 750.
58
See id. at 754.
59
See infra notes 60–135 and accompanying text.
60
Chereck, supra note 28, at 609. As described in Landon v. Plasencia, the
Act allowed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
examine “all aliens” who [sought] “admission or readmission to”
the United States and empower[ed] immigration officers to take
evidence concerning the privilege of any persons suspected of
being an alien “to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside” in the
United States, and to detain for further inquiry “every alien” who
[did] not appear “to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to”
enter. Under [section] 236(a), if an alien [was] so detained, the
officer [was] directed to determine whether the alien “shall be
allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.”
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were added as amendments to the INA in 1996, there were separate
procedural tracks for deportation and exclusion cases.61 One aspect
that truly differentiated deportation proceedings from exclusion
proceedings was that aliens slated for exclusion could apply to the
Attorney General for discretionary relief under the INA’s section
212(c), while aliens placed in deportation proceedings could not.62
Relief under section 212(c) granted an excludable alien re-entry
into the United States as long as two conditions were met.63 First, the
alien must have resided lawfully in the United States for a minimum
of seven years before temporarily leaving the country.64 Second, the
alien could not be excludable on two specific grounds.65 The two
non-applicable grounds included (1) aliens who threatened national
security and (2) aliens guilty of the international abduction of
children.66 In deciding whether an alien qualified for relief, the
immigration judge balanced various factors such as the severity of
the crime(s) and rehabilitation.67 The alien’s sentence could not
exceed five years, and the alien had to show that his or her relatives
would face “hardship” if he or she were deported.68
Although section 212(c) did not originally apply to deportable
aliens, this changed when the BIA was called on to decide the case,

459 U.S. 21, 21 (1982).
61
See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011). Exclusion cases are
cases in which an alien is seeking entry or re-entry to the United States, while
deportation cases are cases in which an alien is already within United States
borders. See id. (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 25). For a detailed description of the
statutory grounds for deporting or excluding an alien from the U.S., see infra note
97 and accompanying text.
62
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479–80.
63
Id. at 480.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 480 n.1. The provision preventing the Attorney General from waiving
exclusion for aliens who were excludable on these two grounds was codified in
INA section 1182(c), but has been repealed. See id. at 479–80. The two
excludable grounds—aliens posing a threat to national security and aliens guilty of
international child abduction—are found in INA section 1182(a)(3) and section
1182(a)(9)(C), respectively. Id. at 480 n.1.
67
Chereck, supra note 28, at 610.
68
Id.
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Matter of L-----.69 In this case, the BIA conceded that the deportation
sections of the Immigration Act of 1917 did not provide for relief,
and that, historically, relief was only granted in exclusion cases.70
The BIA struggled with the question of whether to extend the
provision to deportation cases, noting that the case “involve[d] a
question of difficulty.”71 Finally, the BIA referred the question to the
Attorney General, who reasoned that Congress did not intend for the
immigration laws to operate in such a way as to preclude deportation
cases from the reach of the statute.72 Therefore, the Attorney General

69

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. See Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 7 (BIA
1940). The case Matter of L----- marked the first time an immigration court
applied section 212(c) to a deportation case. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. In that
case, the respondent was a Yugoslavian national who came to the United States in
1909. Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 1. In 1924, he was convicted of larceny
and received a one-year probation. Id. The respondent left the United States in
1939 for a short two-month visit to Yugoslavia, and thereafter was re-admitted to
the country. Id. at 2. Upon re-entry, the respondent failed to present the record of
his 1924 conviction at the immigration inspector as he had been previously
instructed to do. Id. Later, he was brought before the BIA to face deportation
proceedings on the basis of his 1924 conviction. Id. at 1. The Board noted that if
the respondent had not left the country, he would not have faced deportation
proceedings based on the larceny conviction, “first, because the crime was not
committed within 5 years of the respondent’s entry into the United States, and
second, because the respondent was not sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 1
year or more.” Id. at 2. His re-entry made him eligible for deportation because
larceny is a crime that involves moral turpitude. Id. For an explanation of what is
meant by “moral turpitude,” see infra note 76.
70
Matter of L-----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 2–3. The sections of law this case refers
to were later replaced by INA section 212(c). See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268,
270–71 (2d Cir. 1976).
71
Matter of L -----, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 3.
72
Id. at 5. The substance of this part of the Attorney General’s argument was
as follows:
I cannot conclude that Congress intended the immigration
laws to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion.
Granted that respondent’s departure in 1939 exposed him
on
return to the peril of a fresh judgment as to whether he should be
permitted to reside in the United States, such judgment ought not
to depend upon the technical form of the proceedings. No policy
of Congress could possibly be served by such irrational result.
Id.
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found that the provision could apply to deportation cases and
instructed future decisions to follow the same line of reasoning.73
After Matter Of L-----, the BIA’s new policy of applying section
212(c) to deportation as well as exclusion proceedings was pretty
well set in stone.74 The BIA applied Matter of L-----‘s reasoning to
another case called Matter of S-----.75 In that case, the BIA found
that the respondent’s request for section 212(c) relief from
deportation should be granted despite the fact that he had been
inadmissible to the country based upon having committed crimes of
moral turpitude.76 The BIA reasoned that the INA allowed for relief
where: (1) the petitioning alien had been lawfully admitted to the
U.S. as a permanent resident, and (2) had temporarily left the country
on a voluntary basis rather than as the result of deportation
proceedings.77 The respondent met these two criteria since he was
admitted into the country as a permanent resident in 1917 and had
temporarily left the country of his own volition a number of times.78
In reaching the determination that the respondent should be granted
relief, the BIA noted that the respondent had resided in the U.S. for

73

Id.
See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476 at 480.
75
Id. See also Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954). In that case,
the respondent was a national of Spain. Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 392. He
gained U.S. permanent residency in 1917, after which time he left the United States
on several occasions. Id. He was convicted of petit larceny four times between the
years 1935 and 1936. Id. Apart from this, he was also convicted for “unlawfully
operating a coin box receptacle” on two occasions in 1933 and 1937, and was
arrested in 1945 for gambling. Id. at 393.
76
Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 397. The crime of moral turpitude
committed here was petit larceny. See id. Crimes of moral turpitude are crimes
“done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals.” Michael D.
Greenberg, Consequences of Criminal Convictions for the Noncitizen,
IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL 1901, § 19.4.1 (Massachusetts Continuing Legal
Educ., Inc., 2012). It has been defined as “[a]n act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man.” Id. (citing Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 87, 868
(BIA 1994)). This category of crimes is rather broad and complex. See id. Crimes
that have been held to fall within the category include shoplifting, petty theft, and
aggravated assaults. Id.
77
Matter of S-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 393.
78
See id.
74
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most of his life and had not committed any more crimes in the years
following his initial convictions.79 The BIA also seemed to be
influenced by the fact that the respondent’s employer and neighbors
thought well of him.80
In 1976, the Second Circuit decided Francis v. INS, a case that
quickly revealed a serious problem with the manner in which the BIA
was deciding deportation cases under section 212(c).81 In Francis,
the Petitioner appealed the BIA’s decision not to allow him section
212(c) relief because, although he was lawfully admitted to the
United States, he had failed to leave the country temporarily since his
conviction.82 The Second Circuit held that the BIA’s method of
applying section 212(c) to deportation cases violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it treated members of the group of
deported aliens differently: “[d]eportable aliens who had traveled
abroad and returned could receive Section 212(c) relief, while those
who had never left could not.”83 The court noted that the Equal
Protection Clause applies to aliens just as it applies to citizens, even
where the alien has been placed in deportation proceedings.84 It
applied a “minimal scrutiny test” to the BIA’s policy under which
“distinctions between different classes of persons ‘must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.’”85 After this case, a deportable alien no longer had to
leave the country before petitioning for relief under section 212(c).86

79

Id.
Id. at 397.
81
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 480 (citing Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1976)). The petitioner in this case had been convicted of a marijuana
offense. Francis, 532 F.2d at 269. The petitioner did not dispute the fact that he
was deportable, but argued that he should be entitled to relief under 212(c). Id. at
270.
82
See Francis, 532 F.2d at 269.
83
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. (citing Francis, 532 F.2d at 273).
84
Francis, 532 F.2d at 272 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975)).
85
Id. (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
86
See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.
80
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In the next case in the series, Matter of Silvia, the BIA affirmed
the principle laid down in Francis, holding that a deportable
permanent resident could find relief under section 212(c) without
first leaving the country.87 The BIA acknowledged that some of its
prior holdings required voluntary departure as a prerequisite for
obtaining the section 212(c) waiver.88 However, it stated that in light
of the equal protection arguments made in Francis, it would
“withdraw” from the “contrary position” it expressed in the past.89 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Appleman stated that the requirement
that an alien temporarily leave the country and then return to the U.S.
in order to be eligible for relief “no longer seem[ed] relevant.”90
The reach of section 212(c) was altered drastically when AEDPA
was enacted in 1996.91 Section 401 of AEDPA set up a large
category of crimes to which the section 212(c) waiver did not apply,
restricting the number of aliens who could find relief under the
waiver.92 Shortly after AEDPA was enacted, IIRIRA repealed
section 212(c) in its entirety.93 Section 212(c) was replaced with a
new remedy called “cancellation of removal.”94 The government
87

See id.; Matter of Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 31–32 (BIA 1976). The
respondent was convicted of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute.
Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 26. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, two
years of special parole, and a $500 fine. Id. He had been a lawful permanent
resident since 1954. Id. at 27.
88
See Silvia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 28–30.
89
Id. at 29–30. Interestingly, one might detect a hint of reluctance in the
court’s concession. See id. The court prefaced the concession by stating that it had
been informed that the Solicitor General would not seek certiorari for the holding
in Francis. Id. One might wonder if the BIA would have continued to apply the
voluntary departure standard if it had not seemed like it was fighting a losing battle.
90
Id. at 32–33 (Appleman, Irving A., member, concurring).
91
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289 (2001).
92
See id.
93
See, e.g., Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. See also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
94
Chereck, supra note 28, at 611. The cancellation of waivers section
provided that
[a]ny legal, permanent resident alien could apply for cancellation
of removal if he or she had been a permanent resident for
minimum of five years, had resided continuously in the United
States for at least seven years, and had not been convicted of an
aggravated felony. To the contrary, the previous relief granted

278

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-1

also unified exclusion and deportation actions into a procedure called
“removal proceeding.”95 Even though the two actions have been
unified into one proceeding, the statutory bases for the two actions
remained different.96 There are separate lists of substantive grounds
for deportation and exclusion proceedings.97
Public outcry arose concerning the question of whether IIRIRA
would apply retroactively to permanent residents who had been
under section 212(c) was available even to aggravated felons.
For non-permanent residents, cancellation of removal required an
additional three years of physical presence in the United States
and “a showing that the removal would result in ‘exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s permanent resident or
citizen spouse, parent, or child.’” Furthermore, the petitioner’s
sentence could not exceed one year.”
Id.
95

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479.
Id.
97
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) lays out the grounds for excluding an alien from the
United States. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)–(10) (2006). Inadmissible aliens
include those who (1) are excludable on health-related grounds, (2) are excludable
on criminal related grounds, (3) are excludable on security related grounds, (4) are
likely to become a public charge, (5) are seeking to enter the U.S. to undertake
skilled or unskilled labor, (6) are entering illegally and those who have immigration
violations, (7) are unable to meet the documentation requirements, (8) are not
eligible to become citizens, (9) have been removed from the United States in the
past, (10) or are part of a category of miscellaneous individuals including
polygamists, guardians accompanying helpless aliens, child abductors, those who
have violated federal, state, or local voting laws, and former U.S. citizens who gave
up their citizenship to avoid being taxed. See id.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) lists the classes of deportable aliens. Judulang, 132 S. Ct.
at 479. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(7) (2006). Deportable aliens include (1) those
who are inadmissible at the time they enter the United States or are inadmissible at
the time their immigration status is adjusted or who violate their immigration
status; (2) those who commit criminal offenses including those who are convicted
of crimes of moral turpitude, have more than one criminal convictions, commit
aggravated felonies, are involved in “high speed flight from an immigration
checkpoint,” fail to register as sex offenders, those who are convicted of violations
of laws regulating controlled substances, and those who are convicted of certain
offenses involving firearms; (3) those who have failed to register or have falsified
entry documents; (4) those who are engaged in any activity that would threaten the
security of the United States, (5) those who have become a public charge within
five years of entry; (6) and those who have violated federal, state, or local voting
laws. See id.
96
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convicted of crimes before IIRIRA came into force.98 The Federal
Government’s position on the issue was that the laws did apply
retroactively, and section 212(c) relief was therefore impossible for
all cases, including those pending when the legislation came into
force.99 The government’s opinion on these issues, presented by
Janet Reno in the Matter of Soriano, “created confusion in the courts
and resulted in ‘widespread litigation.’”100 Although the opinion
addressed the possibilities of which dates the legislation would apply
to, it did not provide any conclusive answers.101 In response to the
litigation that arose out of the Soriano opinion, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) came out with a rule that created a uniform method for
applying AEDPA.102 Under this rule, AEDPA did not apply
retroactively and aliens who had been placed into deportation
proceedings before April 24, 1996 could still apply for section 212(c)
relief.103
Despite the DOJ’s guidance on the issue, “[t]he issues
surrounding AEDPA and IIRIRA were not completely settled by the
Soriano Rule.”104 The circuit courts were split over the question of
retroactivity.105 This circuit split was not resolved until the Supreme

Baldini-Potermin, Lessons From a “Coin Flip”: The U.S. Supreme Court
and § 212(c) (Again), 89 NO. 6 INTERPRETER RELEASES 293, 294 (2012). See also
Chereck, supra note 28, at 611.
99
See Chereck, supra note 28, at 611.
100
Id. at 611–12.
101
See id. at 612. The issues created by Soriano included:
98

The possible relevance of various other dates in determining
whether or not a particular alien was eligible to apply for section
212(c) relief: the date the alien was placed into proceedings; the
date the alien applied for section 212(c) relief; the
date
any
relevant crimes were committed; and the date any relevant pleas
or convictions were entered.
Id. at 611–12.
102
Id. This is known as the “Soriano Rule.” Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294.
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Court decided INS v. St. Cyr in 2001.106 In that case, the INS argued
that the respondent was removable because the new IIRIRA
legislation affirmed his eligibility for removal.107 Further, the INS
claimed that the IIRIRA was intended to apply to all removal
proceedings initiated after its enactment and that the provisions had a
prospective rather than retrospective effect.108
In considering whether IIRIRA had retroactively repealed section
212(c), the Court acknowledged the presumption against retroactive
legislation.109 It noted that, despite this presumption, Congress has
the power to give laws retroactive effect as long as its intent do so is
clear.110 The Court found that there was no clear indication that
Congress intended to apply IIRIRA’s repeal of section 212(c)
retroactively, since nothing in IIRIRA’s legislative history even
mentioned the effect that the legislation would have on “proceedings
based on pre-IIRIRA convictions that [were] commenced after its

106

See id. (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316–25 (2001)). In that case,
the respondent was a national of Haiti who became a U.S. permanent resident in
1986. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292. In 1996, the respondent pleaded guilty to sale of a
controlled substance, which meant he was subject to deportation. Id. In light of the
recent changes to the law, it was clear that the respondent would have been eligible
for section 212(c) relief at the time he was convicted, although he was not eligible
for the waiver by the time removal proceedings began in 1997. Id.
107
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 315–16.
[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal doctrine
centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly;
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that
reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the
conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.”
Id. at 316 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
110
Id. (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it
is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”) (quoting Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994)).
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effective date.”111 Further, the effective date of IIRIRA itself could
not be considered evidence that Congress intended to create a
retroactive effect.112 The Court coupled the presumption against
retroactivity of an ambiguous statute with “the longstanding principle
of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of the alien,” to come to the conclusion that Congress did not in
fact determine that IIRIRA would apply retroactively.113
The next step in the Court’s inquiry was determining whether
refusing to allow section 212(c) relief to removable aliens would
produce an “impermissible retroactive effect” for aliens who had
entered guilty pleas before section 212(c) was repealed.114 The Court
reasoned that to determine whether a statute has retroactive effect, it
must be decided whether the statute “attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.”115 It is
important to determine whether retroactive application allows for fair
notice and reasonable reliance.116
The Court found that, in the case at hand, the application of
IIRIRA clearly attached new legal consequences to the state of affairs

111

Id. at 318. The Court also pointed out that Congress had made an effort to
specify sections of IIRIRA that did have retroactive effect. Id. at 318–19. The fact
that it did this for certain provisions but not for the provisions that replaced section
212(c) showed that it did not intend to decide how IIRIRA would apply to
convictions that were entered before IIRIRA was enacted. Id. at 319-20.
112
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 317. The Court noted that,
[t]he mere promulgation of an effective date for a statute does not
provide sufficient assurance
that
Congress
specifically
considered the potential unfairness that retroactive application
would produce. For that reason, a “statement that a statute will
become effective on a certain date does not
even
arguably
suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an
earlier date.”
Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257).
113
Id. at 320 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 321 (citing Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357–58 (1999) (“A statute
has retroactive effect when it ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”)).
116
Id. (citing Martin, 527 U.S. at 358).
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that existed before the statute was enacted.117 The aliens who entered
guilty pleas before IIRIRA was enacted did so believing that entering
such pleas would allow them to qualify for section 212(c) relief. 118 It
did not matter that section 212(c)’s relief was discretionary, and
therefore not guaranteed.119 It was sufficient that aliens in a situation
similar to the respondent were highly likely to have received relief
under the statute and were likely to have relied upon such relief.120
Having drawn these conclusions, inter alia, the Court held that
despite section 212(c)’s repeal, the waiver would still apply to
removable aliens who had entered guilty pleas before section
212(c)’s repeal and would have been eligible for section 212(c) relief
at the time the plea was entered.121
The Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr fueled a series of legal
reactions from the various agencies and courts wielding jurisdiction
over the applicable issues.122 For example, the DOJ issued a
regulation requiring deportation charges to correspond to a ground
for excluding an alien for admission into the country. 123 Further, the
BIA decided in a series of cases that deportable aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies could not invoke relief under section 212(c).124
The circuits split once again, this time concerning the issue of what
approach to use to determine whether an alien qualified for the
section 212(c) waiver.125
117

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321.
Id. at 322–23. “Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted
in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such
relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding
whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.” Id. at 323.
119
Id. at 325.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 326.
122
See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294.
123
See id.
124
Id. These cases were In re of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005) and
In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005). Id. However, the BIA used
these cases to emphasize that section 212(c) did not apply to aggravated felons. Id.
Exceptions to that rule were allowed for “drug possession and drug-trafficking
convictions and where a lawful permanent resident was eligible to apply for
adjustment of status in conjunction with a § 212(c) waiver.” Id.
125
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011); Baldini-Potermin, supra
note 98, at 294.
118
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The Second Circuit applied an offense-based statutory
approach.126 This approach evaluated the “underlying offense of a[]
[permanent resident]’s deportation charge” to determine whether the
permanent resident displayed the same characteristics as someone
who could be excluded from the United States.127 Based on the
court’s approach in Francis,128 this approach has been criticized by at
least one scholar, who argued that it “impermissibly expanded the
reach of Francis, creating the unnecessary step of evaluating a
petitioner’s underlying offense.”129
The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal favored the “comparable grounds
approach.”130
The comparable grounds approach relies on
determining whether the statutory ground for deportation charged has
an equivalent in the statutory grounds for exclusion.131 If the ground
for deportation is “substantially equivalent” to one of the grounds for
exclusion, the alien being considered for removal may seek relief
under section 212(c).132 If the ground for deportation does not
correspond with one of the grounds for exclusion, the alien may not
seek relief under section 212(c).133 Although the Ninth Circuit
126

Discretionary Waiver of Deportation in Absence of Voluntary Departure,
U.S. SUP. CT. ACTIONS 1 (2011).
127
Sara Fawk, Immigration Law—Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief from
Deportation: Is it the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 421 (2010).
128
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
129
Fawk, supra note 127, at 421.
130
Id. at 441.
131
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 481–82 (2011).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 482. This approach is possible because as stated previously, the
statutory grounds for deportation and exclusion are different. The following
examples provided by the Court in Judulang v. Holder may help to illustrate how
this comparison works:
Take first an alien convicted of conspiring to distribute
cocaine, whom DHS seeks to deport on the ground that he has
committed an “aggravated felony” involving “illicit trafficking in
a controlled substance.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B),
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Under the comparable-grounds rule, the
immigration judge would look to see if that deportation ground
covers substantially the same offenses as an exclusion ground.
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initially also followed the comparable grounds approach, it
eventually became wary of the comparable grounds approach and
rejected it in its decision in Abebe v. Mukasey.134 It opted instead for
a rationality-based test and presented a legitimate government
interest argument for treating aliens who leave the country
voluntarily differently from those who do not when determining
which aliens are eligible for section 212(c) relief.135
III. FACTS
Joel Judulang’s story begins much like that of the countless other
immigrants whose cases come before an immigration judge or other
court of review. Judulang immigrated to the United States from the
Philippines in 1974 when he was eight years old.136 Various
members of Judulang’s family became U.S. citizens, including his
And according to the BIA in Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257
(1991), the judge would find an adequate match––the exclusion
ground applicable to aliens who have committed offenses
“relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and (a)(2)(C).
Now consider an alien convicted of first-degree sexual
abuse of a child, whom DHS wishes to deport on the ground that
he has committed an “aggravated felony” involving “sexual
abuse of a minor.” §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). May
this alien seek § 212(c) relief? According to the BIA, he may not
do so—not because his crime is too serious (that is irrelevant to
the analysis), but instead because no statutory ground of
exclusion covers substantially the same offenses. To be sure, the
alien’s own offense is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and so fits within an exclusion
ground . . . . But on the BIA’s view, the “moral turpitude”
exclusion ground “addresses a distinctly different and much
broader category of offenses than the aggravated felony sexual
abuse of a minor charge . . . .” And the much greater sweep of
the exclusion ground prevents the alien from seeking
discretionary relief from deportation.
Id.
134

Fawk, supra note 127, at 445–46; see also Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II),
554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009).
135
See Fawk, supra note 127, at 446–47.
136
Brief for Petitioner at 24, Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011) (No.
10-694), 2011 WL 2678268, at *24.
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parents and two sisters.137 Judulang’s daughter was also a U.S.
citizen by birth.138 However, Judulang never naturalized.139 His
parents stated that they did not put Judulang through the
naturalization process because they “d[id] not know the intricacies of
immigration law.”140 Judulang lived continuously in the U.S. as a
lawful permanent resident for thirty-six years.141
Despite the fact that Judulang was raised in the United States, his
status as a permanent resident did not shield him from facing removal
from the U.S.142 On the contrary, two separate criminal convictions
placed Judulang on the path to deportation.143 In 1988, Judulang pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter after taking part in a fight in which
someone was killed.144 Because Judulang was not the killer, he was
charged as an accessory and was sentenced to six years in prison for
this crime.145 He served less than two years of the sentence before
being released on probation.146 In 2005, Judulang pled guilty to a
crime involving theft.147 DHS began deportation proceedings based

Id. It is also notable that Judulang’s grandfather became a U.S. citizen by
virtue of serving in the U.S. military in the Philippines. Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 24–25.
141
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011); Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 136, at 24. This case’s procedural record reveals some confusion regarding
Judulang’s immigration status. See Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 F. App’x 499 (9th
Cir. 2007). In the earlier proceedings, the Ninth Circuit rejected Judulang’s claim
to derivative citizenship based on his parents’ citizenship status. Id. at 501.
Although Judulang argued that both of his parents had been naturalized in the
United States, the court could not find conclusive evidence that both of Judulang’s
parents naturalized before he turned eighteen. Id. at 501–02. Accordingly, the
court held that Judulang failed to meet the burden required to overcome the
rebuttable presumption of alienage created by his birth in the Philippines. See id. at
501.
142
See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
143
See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
144
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482–83 (2011).
145
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25.
146
Id.
147
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483.
137
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on the charge of “aggravated felony” involving a “crime of
violence,” based on the manslaughter conviction from 1988.148
The immigration judge presiding over the case found that
Judulang would have been eligible for section 212(c) if not for the
six-year sentence he was given for the crime, which disqualified
him.149 The BIA “affirmed on different grounds,” holding that
Judulang could not apply for relief under section 212(c) because the
“crime of violence” ground for deportation had no equivalent in the
statutory scheme for exclusion.150 The Ninth Circuit denied
148

Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25.
150
See id.; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483. The BIA’s holding was based on the
holding in the case Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (2005). Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 136, at 25. In Brieva-Perez, the respondent was a native of
Columbia who came to the U.S. as an LPR in 1980. Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 767. He pled guilty to “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,” in 1993. Id. After
respondent was convicted, the INS placed him in removal proceedings based on the
charge of “aggravated felony ‘crime of violence.’” Id. An immigration judge
found that the INS properly categorized the respondent’s offense and also held that
the respondent was not eligible for relief under section 212(c) since the offense did
not match a comparable exclusionary ground. See id. On appeal, the BIA was
asked to decide whether the respondent’s crime had properly been categorized. See
id. The BIA held that unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was properly
categorized as a crime of violence because “[a]n unauthorized driver is likely to use
physical force to gain access to a vehicle and to drive it.” Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N.
Dec. at 770. Because this correct classification meant that the respondent qualified
as “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony,” he was declared to be removable.
Id. Further, the BIA found that the immigration judge correctly denied the
respondent’s eligibility for a 212(c) waiver because the respondent’s crime did not
match closely enough with any of the statutory grounds for exclusion. Id. at 772–
73. The BIA reasoned that,
149

although there need not be perfect symmetry in order to find that
a ground of removal has a statutory counterpart in section 212(a),
there must be a closer match than that exhibited by the incidental
overlap between 101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence) and section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crime involving moral turpitude).
The
distinctly different terminology used to describe the two
categories of offenses and the significant variance in the types of
offenses covered by these two provisions lead us to conclude that
they are not “statutory counterparts” for purposes of section
212(c) eligibility.
Id. at 773.
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Judulang’s petition for review, opting to rely on circuit precedent
affirming the comparable grounds approach.151 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.152
Judulang’s main arguments upon receiving certiorari were
threefold.153 First, he argued that the BIA’s decisions in the cases
Matter of Blake154 and Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales155 changed the
BIA’s previous policy of granting section 212(c) waivers in
deportation cases, resulting in an impermissible retroactive effect.156
Second, he argued that the BIA’s new policy of determining section
212(c) relief eligibility was arbitrary and capricious because it
depended on “semantic differences in the exclusion and deportation
provisions” and depended on the “irrelevant and fortuitous factor[]”
of a permanent resident’s travel history.157 Third, Judulang argued
that the BIA’s approach violated equal protection since there was “no
rational basis for distinguishing between [permanent residents] who
traveled abroad and returned before being placed in deportation
proceedings and those who did not.”158

151

Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011).
Id.
153
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 26–28.
154
In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005).
155
Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005).
156
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136, at 26–27. In his brief, Judulang took
issue with the Ninth Circuit’s position on the waiver, stating that the
152

suggestion that Section 212(c) does not apply in deportation
proceedings at all is contrary to years of congressionally
approved agency practice. Congress has consistently
acknowledged that Section 212(c) provides relief from
deportation as well as exclusion, and even the government has
not contended otherwise. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s
approach offers no basis for affirming the judgment below.
Id.
157
158

Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
The question presented to the Court was “whether the BIA’s
policy for applying § 212(c) in deportation cases is ‘arbitrary [or]
capricious’ under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A).”159 From the outset, Justice Kagan160 stressed that the
law governing this case is very straightforward.161 An administrative
agency must give a reasonable explanation for the policy it sets.162
This is a firm standard, although it is not a difficult one to meet.163
When examining a policy to see if it is arbitrary and capricious, the
Court exercises a narrow scope of review, giving deference to the
agency’s judgment in implementing the policy.164 The Court looks to
see “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.”165
Justice Kagan began her opinion presenting a brief outline of the
history of section 212(c), focusing on the differences between the

159

Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011).
Justice Kagan wrote on behalf of a unanimous court. See id. Justice Kagan
is the newest justice sitting on the Supreme Court, and previously served as the
U.S. solicitor general. Paul Wickham Schmidt, Answering Questions About the
Supreme Court’s Judulang Decision, 59 FED. LAW. 18 (2012).
161
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 483.
165
Id. at 484 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S.,
Inc., the Court laid out the following criteria for determining whether an agency
policy is arbitrary and capricious:
160

Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 43.

Spring 2013

Raising the Standard

289

justifications used for exclusion and deportation proceedings.166 She
explained how two separate lists––one identifying the crimes that
make an alien excludable and the other identifying the crimes that
make an alien deportable––overlap and diverge in various ways.167
She also noted how, historically, section 212(c) relief only applied to
excludable aliens.168 Justice Kagan highlighted the difficulties that
started to arise when the BIA began to apply section 212(c) to
deportation proceedings, and the conflicting results that came out of
the BIA’s decision in the case Matter of L----- that discretionary
relief would only be granted to deportable aliens that left and
reentered the country.169
Justice Kagan then briefly discussed the Second Circuit’s holding
in Francis that allowing discretionary relief only to aliens who first
left the country violated the Equal Protection Clause.170 She noted
how this decision encouraged the BIA to forego the use of an alien’s
travel history in determining section 212(c) eligibility. 171 Justice
Kagan then discussed section 212(c)’s repeal and explained her own
Court’s holding in its decision in INS v. St. Cyr that the waiver
should still be available to those aliens who entered guilty pleas
before the waiver was repealed.172 She emphasized that in coming to
this decision, the Court was concerned with how it could best
preserve “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance,
and settled expectations.”173
After concluding this historical review, Justice Kagan proceeded
to lay out the specifics of the process the BIA utilizes to apply the
section 212(c) waiver to current cases.174 She noted that applying the
waiver to exclusion cases is straightforward because all the BIA has
to do is check the statutory ground upon which DHS bases the
166

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483.
Id. at 479.
168
Id. at 479–80.
169
Id. at 480. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Matter of L-----, see
supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
170
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480. For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Francis v. INS, see supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
171
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 480.
172
Id. at 480–81.
173
Id. at 481 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001).
174
Id. at 481–82.
167
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exclusion decision.175 As long as the statutory ground is not one of
the two grounds that make an alien ineligible for the waiver, the alien
will be considered for relief.176 If the alien is eligible, the BIA
simply decides whether to grant relief by focusing on a variety of
factors including how long the alien has lived in the U.S., the alien’s
family background, and the seriousness of the crime committed.177
Justice Kagan noted that despite the straightforward nature of the
exclusion analysis, there is a noticeable difference in the level of
difficulty when ascertaining waiver eligibility if the alien in question
has been slated for deportation.178 To illustrate how complex the
process for determining eligibility for the waiver is in a deportation
case, Justice Kagan described the two approaches the BIA has
employed over time to accomplish the task.179 She noted that the
first approach, which the BIA used in the past, is much like the
method it utilizes for exclusion cases.180 The BIA first looked to see
whether the crime for which the alien was being deported fell within
one of the statutory exclusion grounds.181 If it did, the BIA applied
the same kind of factors-based test used in exclusion cases.182
Justice Kagan then moved on to the second approach that the BIA
had been using to determine waiver eligibility in deportation cases
since 2005—the comparable grounds approach.183 She likened the
comparable grounds approach to a Venn diagram: “Within one circle
are all the criminal offenses composing the particular ground of
deportation charged. Within other circles are the offenses composing
the various exclusion grounds.
When, but only when, the

175

Id.
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481–82.
177
Id. The specific list of factors that Justice Kagan includes are, “the
seriousness of the offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the
duration of the alien’s residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the
number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed
Forces.’” (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001)).
178
Id. at 481.
179
Id. at 481–82.
180
Id. at 481.
181
Id.
182
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481.
183
Id.
176
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‘deportation circle’ sufficiently corresponds to one of the ‘exclusion
circles’ may an alien apply for [section] 212(c) relief.”184
Although Justice Kagan recognized the authority that federal
agencies have over their statutes, she emphasized that the Court
cannot turn a blind eye to suspect policies.185 Courts are responsible
for making sure that agencies make policies that are reasonable.186
Courts must look to see whether an agency’s decision “was based on
a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment.”187 Justice Kagan then stated that the BIA
had failed the test of reasonableness by deciding whether an alien
qualified for section 212(c) relief by relying on a “chance
correspondence” between the various deportation and exclusion
categories.188 Such an inquiry could not determine whether an alien
should be allowed to remain in the United States.189
Justice Kagan took note of the parties’ disagreement over
whether the waiver should be applied equally in both exclusion and
deportation cases.190 While Judulang argued that it should, the
Government argued that immigration law has always treated
exclusion and deportation cases differently and that the Government
has valid reasons for doing so because applying section 212(c)
uniformly to both types of cases might cause aliens to effectively use
that type of discretionary relief as a crutch.191 Justice Kagan declined
to reach these arguments, stating that the dispute between the two

184

Id. at 482.
See id. at 483–84.
186
See id.
187
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
188
Id.
189
Id. In fact, the only reason why Judulang was refused section 212(c) relief
by the BIA was that the deportable crime of violence he had been charged with did
not have a corresponding exclusionary basis. Id. Judulang’s argument was that if
he would have qualified for relief in an exclusion case (which he would have based
on his previous crime of voluntary manslaughter, a crime of moral turpitude
covered by an exclusion ground), then he should also be able to seek section 212(c)
in the instant deportation case. See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 136,
at 47–51).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 484–85.
185
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parties was irrelevant.192 She made it clear that the Court did not
question the BIA’s policy preferences for limiting the extent of
section 212(c) relief, noting that it may have legitimate reasons for
doing so.193 The Court’s only concern was whether the BIA was
applying its chosen policy reasonably.194
Justice Kagan then went on to explain why the use of the
comparable grounds rule does not meet the reasonability
requirement, likening the usefulness of the inquiries it measures to
that of flipping a coin.195 The approach does not consider the actual
merits of the case.196 It fails to examine the factors that might be
important to establishing whether or not an alien should be eligible
for section 212(c) relief.197 Instead, it bases the entire decision of
eligibility “on an irrelevant comparison between statutory
provisions.”198 Justice Kagan argued that although the Court would
not decide whether Judulang should be entitled to relief, the fact that
his case failed under the comparable grounds approach did not make
him less deserving of the relief.199 Justice Kagan also expressed the
Court’s concern that the outcome of the comparable grounds
approach may depend on how a particular immigration official
decided to charge the alien in question.200 Depending on how the

192

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485.
Id.
194
See id.
195
Id. at 485–86.
196
See id. at 486.
197
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 487.
198
Id. at 485.
199
See id. at 485–86.
200
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 486. Justice Kagan noted that,
193

the Government has provided no reason to think that immigration
officials must adhere to any set scheme in deciding what charges
to bring, or that those officials are exercising their charging
discretion with § 212(c) in mind . . . . So at base everything hangs
on the fortuity of an individual official’s decision. An alien
appearing before one official may suffer deportation; an
identically situated alien appearing before another may gain the
right to stay in this country.
Id. (citation omitted).
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alien is charged, his or her conviction may fall in various deportation
grounds that may or may not correspond to specific exclusion
grounds.201
Next, Justice Kagan identified and rejected the government’s
three arguments defending the comparable grounds approach.202 The
government’s first argument was that the comparable grounds rule is
in keeping with section 212(c)’s language.203 Justice Kagan’s
response to this argument was that the government’s description of
the statute was incorrect; it only directs the Attorney General to
“admit any excludable alien, except if the alien is charged with two
specified grounds.”204 Furthermore, the statute is not aimed at
deportation cases in the first place, so it is inapplicable anyway; it
only instructs how to deal with exclusion cases.205 The government’s
second argument was that the comparable grounds rule is valid
because it has been utilized over the years.206 The Court’s response
was that the BIA’s approach was not in fact consistent, but varied
throughout the years.207 This variance is evidenced by the BIA’s
approaches in Matter of T-----,208 Matter of Granados,209 and Matter
of Hernandez-Casillas.210 Lastly, the government argued that the
201

See id.
Id. at 487–90.
203
Id. at 487.
204
Id.
205
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488.
206
See id.
207
Id.
208
Matter of T-----, 5 I. & N. Dec. 389, 390 (BIA 1953). In this case, the BIA
denied section 212(c) relief to an alien who had entered the U.S. without inspection
and by making false representations. Id. at 389–90. The BIA emphasized that
section 212(c) discretion is limited to the deportation grounds fond in the INA. Id.
at 389.
209
Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979). In this case, the
BIA found that section 212(c) relief could not waive deportability based on a
“conviction of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun.” Id. at 726.
Because possession of such a shotgun was not a ground of excludability, it was not
covered by section 212(c). Id. at 728. The BIA emphasized that although its
decision in Francis extended the reach of section 212(c)’s applicability, it “did not
increase the statutory grounds to which section 212(c) relief may be applied.” Id.
210
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488–89. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 262, 266 (BIA 1990). The case involved a Mexican citizen who was
charged with entering the U.S. without inspection. Id. at 263. In discussing the
202
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comparable grounds rule “saves time and money.”211 The Court
responded to this argument by stating that although cost is an
important consideration, low cost is not a means for overcoming an
arbitrary and capricious policy.212 The Court also noted that the
respondent’s eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver, the BIA cited Matter of
Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, inter alia, for the proposition that the waiver was
only available to aliens whose deportation ground corresponded with a
“comparable ground of exclusion.” Id. at 264–65. The BIA found that requiring
corresponding deportation and exclusion grounds presented an “anomalous
situation,” and stated that it would change its approach to extend section 212(c) to
all deportability grounds except a few specific grounds related to “subversives and
war criminals.” Id. at 265. It reasoned as follows:
It is . . . evident that section 212(c) has . . . been expanded to
encompass many aliens not originally contemplated by the
statute.
We have concluded that the same fundamental
fairness/equal protection arguments made in Francis v. INS . . .
can and should be invoked to make section 212(c) relief available
to aliens deportable under any ground of deportability
except
those where there is a comparable ground of exclusion which has
been specifically excepted from section 212(c). . . . Having made
the section 212(c) waiver, a form of relief ostensibly available
only in exclusion proceedings, available in deportation
proceedings, we find no reason not to make it applicable to all
grounds of deportability with the exception of those comparable
to the exclusion grounds expressly excluded by section 212(c),
rather than limiting it, as now, to grounds of deportability having
equivalent exclusion provisions.
Id. at 266. The BIA conceded that this new expansion conflicted with its prior
holdings in cases like Granados. Id. It chose to turn from Granados and similar
decisions that “limited the availability of section 212(c).” Id. at 267. In keeping
with its new approach, the BIA remanded the respondent’s case to allow the
respondent an opportunity to apply for the section 212(c) waiver. Id. at 269.
211
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 489. The Government’s exact argument was that
the current approach of comparing deportation grounds to exclusion grounds was
more simple than the approach Judulang was advocating since it could “be
accomplished in just a few ‘precedential decisions’” which could be applied to
multiple cases. Id. Judulang’s approach would be more cumbersome because it
would inherently require the Government to look at each conviction and decide
whether it fell within one of the grounds for exclusion. Id. In other words, the
Government’s argument was essentially that the current approach allowed the
Government to do less work and also lowered the number of aliens who qualified
for relief. See id.
212
Id. at 490.
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comparable grounds rule probably didn’t save as much money as the
government argued it did.213 In reality, Judulang’s approach would
be very similar to what has been done in the past, which would allow
for use of existing precedent.214
In conclusion, the Court stated that it must reverse a policy when
it cannot find a reason for the policy.215 Justice Kagan emphasized
that in this case, the BIA’s comparable grounds rule was not
reasonably connected to “the purposes and concerns of the
immigration laws.”216
She also emphasized that deportation
decisions cannot be left to chance.217 Since the government could not
successfully argue that the comparable grounds rule should be
applied, it could not “pass muster under ordinary principles of
administrative law.”218 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s

213

Id.
Id. The Court also noted that if the Government’s interest was cost and
time effectiveness, it could come up with an alternative policy that would be
economically efficient as long as the policy complied with the instant decision and
the Court’s decision in St. Cyr. Id.
215
Id.
216
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 490. Specifically, the comparable grounds rule
“allows an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter
of the utmost importance–whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to
this country may stay here.” Id. In a passionate critique of the methodology
behind the rule, Justice Kagan wrote,
214

recall that the BIA asks whether the set of offenses in a particular
deportation ground lines up with the set in an exclusion ground.
But so what if it does? Does an alien charged with a particular
deportation ground become more worthy of relief because that
ground happens to match up with another? Or less worthy of
relief because the ground does not? The comparison in no way
changes the alien’s prior offense or his other attributes
and
circumstances. So it is difficult to see why that comparison
should matter. Each of these statutory grounds contains a slew of
offenses. Whether each contains the same slew has nothing to do
with whether a deportable alien whose prior conviction falls
within both grounds merits the ability to seek a waiver.
Id. at 485.
217
Id. at 487.
218
Id. at 490.
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decision was reversed and the case was remanded.219
V. IMPACT
A. Judulang’s Impact on Administrative Law
The arbitrary and capricious standard promotes method and order
in immigration decisions. Immigration is a complex area and, in
light of the current buzz surrounding this legal topic, it is important
for courts deciding immigration cases to have a sound basis of law to
work from instead of utilizing an ad hoc approach that has no basis in
precedent. The demands of the arbitrary and capricious standard
encourage adopting solid methodology. Although in Judulang the
Court did not definitively state which method should be applied to
deportation cases,220 it did make it clear that methods such as the
comparable grounds rule, which have no basis in reason, cannot be
utilized to remove aliens from the country.221
In her opinion, Justice Kagan made the point that the arbitrary
and capricious standard is designed to prevent decisions from being
made based on chance.222 As was evidenced through this note’s
discussion on the impact of the Francis holding, rules that are
arbitrary can have consequences as severe as violations of
constitutional equal protection rights.223 When deportation cases are
not decided upon chance, immigrants have greater access to due
process and are able to avoid some of the severe consequences that
come from being separated from their families and lives in the United
States.
The arbitrary and capricious standard also promotes discipline in
agencies that are required to make discretionary decisions while
giving the agencies great deference in decision-making. In Judulang,
the Court made it clear that the BIA can make its own decisions
concerning the standards it uses to determine which aliens qualify for
the section 212(c) waiver.224 The Court was simply saying that the
219

Id.
See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294.
221
See supra Part IV.
222
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 487.
223
See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
224
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483, 485, 490.
220
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BIA cannot establish whether or not aliens in Judulang’s situation
should be eligible for section 212(c) relief through the comparable
grounds method, because there is no reason behind it.225 Because the
Court takes a narrow approach to adjudicating the soundness of
agency policies under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies
can be assured of maintaining autonomy.226 The Court only holds
agencies accountable for being reasonable when making policy
decisions.227
B. Judulang’s Impact on Immigration Law
Judulang was arguably highly anticipated by the immigration law
community.228 It was expected that the case would answer important
questions about whether section 212(c) relief would be available after
the passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA.229 Despite the fact that the case
did not address every conceivable issue concerning deportation cases,
Judulang represents a step in the right direction. In this case, we see
the Court encouraging clarity in defining standards for deportation
cases, where such standards have been missing in the past. Although
on a smaller scale this case seems only to affect deportation cases,
the Court’s demand that the BIA meet a higher standard in decisionmaking in this one area may well affect other important immigration
questions.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court in Judulang followed its INS
v. St. Cyr ruling, affirming that section 212(c) relief does apply to
those permanent residents who were convicted of crimes before
AEDPA and IIRIRA came into effect.230 Affirmation of what is
arguably a generous extension of amnesty for aliens (dare say, even
criminal aliens) may come as a shock to those who cast a wary eye
on immigrants in general.231 Although it would be incorrect to
225

See id. at 490.
Id. at 483 (stating that, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
227
Id. at 484–85.
228
See, e.g. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 754.
229
See id.
230
See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294.
231
See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
226
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assume that the Judulang Court was making a political statement
about how aliens should be treated, the Court’s decision might at
least signify that removal of criminal aliens is not simply a race
against the clock; but, rather, has powerful and important legal
implications which require any methods employed to be utilized
carefully rather than haphazardly.
Notably, the court also overruled the BIA’s decisions in the cases
Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva-Perez, where the BIA found
that aliens deportable on the basis of having committed aggravated
felonies were barred from obtaining relief under section 212(c).232
The Court found that the standards used to evaluate these cases were
arbitrary and capricious.233 Blake’s precedent was actually what the
BIA had used to come to the conclusion that Judulang was not
entitled to section 212(c) relief at the administrative level.234 Blake
embodied the comparable grounds rule, requiring that an alien’s
ground of deportability have a comparable ground of exclusion
before allowing the alien relief under section 212(c).235
There is evidence that the Judulang holding has attracted
attention in the legal field.236 After the Court’s decision was

232

See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 294–95.
Id. at 295. See also supra note 124 and accompanying text. For a detailed
discussion of the facts and holding in Brieva-Perez, see supra note 150.
234
See Schmidt, supra note 160, at 18–19.
235
See id. at 18.
236
See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296. After the case was decided,
one immigration blog utilized the implications of its holding as a warning to
resident aliens.
See Judulang v. Holder: Resident Aliens Beware!,
findanimmigrationattorney.com
(Jan.
16,
2012
10:43
AM),
http://www.findanimmigrationattorney.com/Featured-News/2012/Judalang-vHolder-Resident-Aliens-Beware-.aspx.
233

What began as a typical immigration/deportation issue has
now become a nationally recognized deficit in government policy
and procedure. If we cannot rely on the governing boards of our
nation to practice sound, reasonable, and fair decision making
processes, then just who or what can we trust?
....
Too often, it would seem that the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ has ruled for deportation, or denial to appeal to the
Attorney General for relief, when it has no rationale for doing so.
The case of Judalang [sic] v. Holder may be one of hot contest at
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released, a group of legally affiliated associations came out with a
practice advisory that applied the Judulang holding to various aspects
of immigration law.237 The advisory also discussed motions to
reopen the cases of permanent residents that were removed from the
United States and provided sample motions that can be utilized by
practitioners.238
Although this might be considered a small
development in the law, its implications may actually prove quite
enormous for an area of the law where motions to reopen have
virtually been unheard of in the past.239
Cases like Judulang may very well signify that important changes
are coming to immigration law.240 Adriane Meneses has noted that,
“[r]ecent Supreme Court holdings seem to be calling for
Congressional re-consideration of immigration laws, especially in
areas in which criminal law intersects with immigration
regulation.”241 In particular, Meneses writes that holdings such as
Judulang “appear to be significant signs of a move away from
unfettered expansion of excludability and deportability as well as ongoing restriction or elimination of review and relief.”242

the moment, but it certainly begs questions such as, “How many
like it came before; how many like it are still to come?”
Id.
237

Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296. See also IMPLICATIONS OF
JUDULANG V. HOLDER FOR LPRS SEEKING § 212(C) RELIEF AND FOR OTHER
INDIVIDUALS CHALLENGING ARBITRARY AGENCY POLICIES, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD & IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT (2012) [hereinafter
IMPLICATIONS],
available
at
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_I
mplications_%20of_Judalang_v_Holder.pdf.
238
Baldini-Potermin, supra note 98, at 296. See also IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 237. The Honorable Paul Wickham Schmidt has also suggested that
immigration courts and the BIA may see motions to reopen the cases of aliens
whose cases were decided under the BIA’s decision in decision. See Schmidt,
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Whatever impact Judulang may have, it is important to note that
any effects may not extend far into the future.243 This is because “the
number of deportable respondents who pleaded [sic] guilty before
April 24, 1996—and thus could benefit from the Court’s ruling in
Judulang—is probably dwindling.”244 Once that generation of
respondents fades out, the Judulang decision may no longer carry so
much weight, since it will essentially be a moot point.245
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been much debate surrounding the deportation of
criminal aliens. The 1996 immigration reforms embodied by
AEDPA and IIRIRA have had a significant impact on the availability
of certain forms of relief for permanent residents convicted of crimes
that made them deportable. One of the most important impacts the
legislation had was the removal of the section 212(c) waiver. Before
AEDPA and IIRIRA were adopted in 1996, section 212(c) of the
INA allowed permanent residents who pled guilty to certain crimes to
file a petition with the Attorney General, who would then decide
whether to allow the permanent resident relief from deportation.
After AEDPA and IIRIRA came into force, the section 212(c)
waiver became a thing of the past. However, both administrative
courts and the circuit courts struggled with questions of retroactivity
and adopted varying approaches to how to deal with cases in which
permanent residents who would have been eligible for the section
212(c) waiver before the legislation was enacted still sought some
kind of relief from deportation. The confusion led to a series of
appeals alleging flawed judicial reasoning in making determinations
as to which aliens would be allowed to utilize the waiver even after
its repeal.
This note focused on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Judulang v. Holder, the result of years of confusion concerning what
standard the BIA should apply to cases where section 212(c) relief is
still at issue. In this case, the Court found that the BIA’s method of
comparing the grounds established for an alien’s deportation to the
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statutory grounds for excluding an alien from the U.S. (the
“comparable grounds” approach) was arbitrary and capricious, as it
was not rooted in any reasonable theory.
Judulang has impacted both immigration law and administrative
law by reinforcing the notion that standards for the review of
immigration cases must be grounded in sound reasoning and cannot
be invented on a whim. Although the case does not address every
issue related to immigration law, it does take a step forward by
resolving at least one issue in the area of the deportation of criminal
aliens. As the number of deported aliens remains steady and,
perhaps, increases, this decision promises to remain of particular
importance for some time. If nothing else, it ensures that a portion of
the population that is often viewed as “the worst of the worst” still
has access to fairly adjudicated proceedings, a principle which is at
the core of a properly functioning judicial system.

